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United States v. Amer and the International Parental
Kidnapping Crime Act-The Final Answer to the
Problem of International Parental Abductions?
I. Introduction
Each year, non-custodial parents abduct approximately 1000
American children and flee to foreign countries.' The rate of such
kidnappings has doubled in the last decade.2 As the rate of
abductions continues to rise, so too does the traumatic effect on
children, who are taken away to strange places, out of the care of
one of their parents.3
In 1995, Ahmed Amer was among the 1000 parents who took
their children outside of the United States, away from their other
custodial parent. Although in that respect Mr. Amer was only one
in a thousand, his act had great significance, as he became the
subject of the first appellate case arising under the International
Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of 1993 (IPKCA).' In United
States v. Amer, Amer raised a number of issues involving the
application and the scope of the IPKCA, including questions about
vagueness of the Act, the constitutionality of its provisions with
respect to the free exercise of religion, the Act's relationship to the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (Hague Convention on Child Abduction), and the
district court's ability to impose both a special condition of
supervised release and sentence enhancement for interference with
See DOJ Announces New Program to Reclaim Abducted Children Abroad, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12123452.
2 See Elizabeth Fernandez, Custody Flouters to Pay Dearer Senate Sanctions
Respond to Plight of Children, S. F. EXAMINER, June 19, 1997, at A8.
3 See Antoinette Passanante, Note, International Parental Kidnapping: The Call
for an Increased Federal Response, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677-78 (1996).
4 See United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 877 (2d Cir. 1997).
5 See id. ("The IPKCA was enacted in December 1993, but has apparently been
sparingly used. We have found no published decision of a federal court construing this
statute.").
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the administration of justice.6
Because Amer raised a number of issues concerning the scope
and application of the IPKCA, the Second Circuit's analysis serves
as the first gauge of the efficacy of the Act. Four years after the
promulgation of the IPKCA, the Amer decision provides a clearer
picture of the Act's power to return internationally abducted
children and its ability to deter other parents contemplating such
an act.
Part II of this Note explores the facts of Ahmed Amer's
international kidnapping of his children, his subsequent criminal
arrest and sentencing, and the Second Circuit's review of the
issues which Ahmed raised on appeal . Part III examines the
background of the IPKCA, including: the prior domestic and
international legal responses to the growing practice of
international kidnappings; legislative history and structure of the
IPKCA; and the background law necessary to understand the
statutory and judicial precedent underlying the various issues
raised by Amer on appeal.8 Parts IV and V examine the
background law and significance of Amer's challenge to the
IPKCA based on its vagueness 9 and on the Free Exercise Clause,
respectively.'0  Part VI examines the background law and
significance of the Second Circuit's decision regarding the
application and constitutionality of the IPKCA's criminal
sentencing provisions." Part VII of this Note looks at additional
problems that could arise in the application of the IPKCA, and
Part VIII concludes that, although the IPKCA shows promise as a
remedy to international parental child abductions, its efficacy will
not be realized until the federal government utilizes the power it
has under the Act to force the return of children and their
abductors from foreign hideaways. 2
6 See id.
7 See infra notes 13-94 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 95-150 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 151-74 and accompanying text.
0 See infra notes 175-204 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 205-91 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text.
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II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts and Procedural History
Ahmed and Mona Amer, Egyptian citizens, were married in
Egypt in 1980."3 Their first son, Amachmud, was born in Egypt in
1984.14 In 1985, Ahmed moved to the United States in search of
employment, and Mona and Amachmud followed in 1987. Mona
and Ahmed had two more children while in the United States: a
daughter named Maha, born in 1989, and a second son, Omar,
born in 1991.16 In 1991, Ahmed became a naturalized citizen of
the United States, while also retaining his Egyptian citizenship.' 7
Mona became a permanent U.S. resident alien in 1992.18 It is not
clear whether Amachmud ever obtained U.S. citizenship, but his
younger siblings Maha and Omar had citizenship by birth.9
The Amer's marriage began to break down in the early 1990s,
and in 1994 Ahmed left the family apartment at Mona's request.2"
Although the children remained with Mona, Ahmed was allowed
to visit the children freely, usually once a week.2' At this point,
Ahmed began to talk to Mona about the family returning to Egypt.
Although it appeared that Mona initially agreed, she eventually
decided that neither she nor the children would return to Egypt.
2
Accordingly, she forbade Ahmed from taking the children out of
the United States."
On January 27, 1995, Mona left the children at her apartment
13 See United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 876 (2d Cir. 1997).
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See id.
Is See id.
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See id. at 876-77.
23 See id. The Amers made only one trip to Egypt as a family between the time
they came to the United States and the time of this lawsuit. See id. at 876.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
in Ahmed's care while she ran some errands." When she returned,
the children were gone and she has not seen them since then." She
later learned that Ahmed had taken the children to Egypt.26
Mona received full legal custody of the children from the
Queens Family Court in February 1995, and the court issued a
warrant for Ahmed's arrest.27 Shortly thereafter, in May 1995,
Ahmed obtained full custody of Maha and Omar from an Egyptian
court.'
Ahmed returned to the United States in June 1995, while the
children remained .with his mother in Egypt.29  He was
apprehended in New Jersey the following month, and was
eventually indicted for "knowingly and intentionally remov[ing]
and retain[ing] children who had been in the United States ...
outside the United States with the intent to obstruct the lawful
exercise of parental rights' in violation of the IPKCA.'30 Ahmed
was convicted in a jury trial in the Eastern District of New York
and sentenced to twenty-four months of imprisonment along with
a one-year term of supervised release, conditioned on his return of
the three children to the United States.3
B. Holding of the Second Circuit
Because Ahmed's case marked the first appeal under the
International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act, the Second Circuit
faced several issues of first impression in analyzing Ahmed's
challenges to the Act.32 Ahmed raised a number of issues
regarding the validity of the IPKCA. First, he argued that the Act
was unconstitutional, contending that it was vague and that it
24 See id. at 877.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (1994).
31 SeeAmer, 110 F.3d at 877.
32 See id. at 876.
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unduly restricted the free exercise of his religion.33 Ahmed also
argued that the district court erred in its application of the Act:
first, when it denied him the right to use certain affirmative
defenses found in the Hague Convention on Child Abduction;
second, when it conditioned his supervised release on the return of
the children; and third, when it enhanced his sentence based on his
interference with the administration of justice.34
1. Void for Vagueness
Ahmed argued that a number of the provisions of the IPKCA
failed to explicitly warn him which acts were prohibited under the
statute, and should therefore be "void for vagueness." However,
the Second Circuit rejected this argument and stated that because
Ahmed "engage[d] in some conduct that is clearly proscribed [by
the statute, he] ... cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others. 36 The Second Circuit explained
that while the contested terms might be unclear in certain extreme
circumstances, the provisions of the IPKCA that Ahmed
challenged as vague clearly applied to the crime for which he was
convicted; therefore, Ahmed had no defense based on the Act's
37
vagueness.
The Second Circuit also explained why Ahmed's challenges to
specific terms of the Act failed. Ahmed first argued that the term
"retains," found in 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a), "is vague because the Act
does not define the duration or length of time that a child must be
'retain[ed]' outside the United States in order to constitute a
violation of the IPKCA."38 The Second Circuit conceded that in a
hypothetical situation involving a two or three day retention, this
term might be more difficult to interpret.39 However, the court
then stated that "there can be no doubt" that a retention from
33 See id. at 877.
34 See id.
35 Id. at 877-78.
36 Id. at 878 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 495
(1982)).
37 See id.
38 Id.
39 See id.
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January 27, 1995 to August 4, 1995 falls within the confines of the
Act.
40
Ahmed also argued that the IPKCA was overly vague because
it did not specify how long a child must have lived in the United
States before his or her removal or retention would constitute a
violation of the Act.4' In response, the court pointed out that the
Amer children had not been on a simple week-long vacation to the
United States prior to their removal. 42 In fact, the two youngest
children had lived in the United States all their lives, and the
oldest child since 1987.43 In this light, the Second Circuit felt that
there was no real issue concerning the duration of the children's
stay in the United States before their removal. 44
Finally, the court denied Ahmed's argument that the phrase
"parental rights" was impermissibly vague.4 In fact, the court
showed how the legislative history of the IPKCA clearly indicated
that "'parental rights' are to be determined by reference to State
law, in accordance with the Hague Convention ..... " According
to the Hague Convention on Child Abduction, parental rights are
governed by "the law of the State in which the child was
habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention."' 7
Again, the court conceded that in some instances the state of
"habitual residence" might be uncertain.48 However, in Ahmed's
case, New York was obviously the place of "habitual residence,"
because Amachmud had resided there for eight years and the other
two children had lived there since birth.49 Therefore, although the
40ld
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-390, at 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2419, 2422).
47 Hague Convention, opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980, art. 3(a), T.I.A.S. No.
11670, 19 I.L.M. 1501 [hereinafter Hague Convention on Child Abduction].
48 SeeAmer, l10F.3dat878.
49 See id. Under New York law, Mona is to have the right to physical custody of
her children as the biological mother until that right is terminated by law. See id. (citing
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Second Circuit conceded that the contested terms could, in certain
limited situations, be impermissibly vague, it concluded that
because Ahmed's actions were clearly in violation of the IPKCA,
he could not challenge the Act as being void for vagueness."
2. Free Exercise
Ahmed next argued that the IPKCA violated his constitutional
right to free exercise of religion by criminalizing the act of
returning children to their parents' homeland for religious
reasons.5 The court dismissed the idea that Ahmed was denied his
free exercise rights, pointing out that Ahmed had never even
argued that his removal of the children was religiously motivated
until his appeal." However, because it acknowledged that there
was the possibility of an infringement of a constitutionally
protected right, the Second Circuit examined whether the IPKCA
did, in fact, violate the Free Exercise Clause." The court
construed the IPKCA as punishing parental kidnappers "solely for
the harm they cause," not for their religious beliefs or
motivations. 4  Holding that "[a] neutral law of general
applicability does not violate the Free Exercise Clause simply
because the law imposes an incidental burden on a religious
practice,"55 the court concluded that the IPKCA did not violate the
Constitution. 6
In re Michael B., 604 N.E.2d 122, 127-28 (N.Y. 1992)).
50 See id. at 879.
51 See id.
52 See id. The only explanations that the defense proffered to justify Ahmed's
conduct were that: (1) Mona was neglecting the children, (2) the children would be
"better taken care of in Egypt," (3) Ahmed had "finished [his business] in [the United
States] and... wish[ed] to settle in [his] own Nation among [his] friends and relatives,"
and (4) "the schools over there were better." Id. (alteration in original).
53 See id.
54 Id.
55 Id. (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990)).
56 See id. In a footnote, the Second Circuit also examined whether the IPKCA
was unconstitutional under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. See id. at
879 n.1. However, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was later found
unconstitutional in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997).
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3. Hague Convention on Child Abduction Defenses
Section 1204(c) of the IPKCA provides three affirmative
defenses to the act of parental kidnapping." Ahmed argued that
section 1204(d) of the Act, which states that the IPKCA "does not
detract from The Hague Convention,""8 incorporated the additional
affirmative defenses set out in the Hague Convention on Child
Abduction." However, based on statutory construction and
legislative history of the IPKCA, the Second Circuit concluded
that Ahmed's affirmative defenses did not include those contained
in the Hague Convention on Child Abduction."
In analyzing the structure of the IPKCA, the Second Circuit
pointed out that because the Act explicitly lists only three
affirmative defenses, it "is a strong indication that the defenses
arguably inferred from the Hague Convention are not available in
an IPKCA prosecution," absent a clear indication that such
defenses apply." The court also looked to the legislative history of
the IPKCA to determine the Act's relationship to the civil
remedies provided in the Hague Convention on Child Abduction.62
The court emphasized that the IPKCA was meant to be a "gap
filler" in cases where children were abducted to or from countries
that were not parties to the Hague Convention on Child
Abduction.6 Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded that
when the Hague Convention on Child Abduction is applicable,
Congress intended for the Convention's civil mechanisms to be
used instead of the IPKCA.64 However, because Egypt was not a
51 See Amer, 110 F.3d at 880. These defenses are (1) the defendant was acting
pursuant to a valid court order giving legal custody or visitation rights obtained under
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, (2) the defendant was fleeing domestic
violence, or (3) the defendant had legal custody, and was unable to return the child in
time due to circumstances beyond his or her control, and the defendant notified the other
parent within 24 hours of the expiration of his visitation period and returned the child as
soon as possible. See 18 U.S.C. § 1204(c) (1994).
58 Amer, 110 F.3d at 880 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1204(d)).
59 See id.
60 See id. at 880-82.
61 Id. at 880-81.
62 See id. at 881-82 (citing Passanante, supra note 3, at 692 & n.90).
63 See id. at 882.
64 See id. "Congress continued to believe that the civil mechanism of the Hague
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signatory country to the Hague Convention on Child Abduction,
its civil remedies did not apply to Ahmed's situation.65 Therefore,
the Second Circuit concluded that Ahmed could not rely on the
Hague Convention on Child Abduction's affirmative defenses and
was limited to the three affirmative defenses listed in the IPKCA."
4. Special Condition of Supervised Release
Ahmed's sentence included a special condition of supervised
release that required him to return the children to their mother in
the United States.67 Ahmed made five arguments in connection
with this supervised release."
First, Ahmed argued that the district court exceeded its
authority under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("sentencing guidelines") in imposing the condition.69 In response,
the Second Circuit looked to section 5D1.3(b) of the sentencing
guidelines, which allows courts to impose conditions of supervised
release provided that the condition is related to:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant, and (2) the need for the
sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to -criminal
conduct, to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant, and to provide the defendant with ... correctional
treatment in the most effective manner."
The Second Circuit had previously held that although the
sentencing guidelines in section 5D1.3(b) utilize the conjunction
"and," a condition could be imposed if it was "reasonably related
Convention, when available, was the preferred route for resolving the complex and
difficult problems surrounding international child abductions," Id.
65 See id.
66 See id. The Second Circuit left open the. question of when Hague. Convention
on Child Abduction defenses might be utilized in an IPKCA case, stating that
"[a]lthougli it might be a close question whether a defendant shold be permitted to raise
Hague Convention defenses when, for instance, there is a parallel or ongoing civil
proceeding under the Convention and its implementinglegislation, we do not need to
decide that question in this case." Id.
67 See id.
68 See id. at 882-83.
69 See id. at 883 (examining 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (1994) and U.S. SENTENcING
GUIDEL nEs MANUAL § 5D1.3(b) (1989)).
70 Id. (quoting U.S. SENrENciNG GUmELINEs MANUAL § 5D1.3(b) (1989)).
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to any one or more of the specified factors."'" Based on the nature
of Ahmed's offense, the court concluded that "it is difficult to
imagine a condition more closely tailored to the crime and the
criminal in question than this one. 72 The court also felt that the
"return" condition served the deterrent purpose of the statute, both
for Ahmed personally and for parents in general, and therefore was
within the purpose set out by the sentencing guidelines.73
Ahmed also argued that his criminal sentence was wrongfully
enhanced for his retention of the children, an action he contended
was inconsistent with the intent of the Sentencing Commission. 4
The Second Circuit responded that although there was no specific
reference to offense enhancement under the IPKCA, this omission
did not necessarily prohibit the district court from "enhancing"
Ahmed's criminal sentence.75  The Second Circuit rejected
Ahmed's argument, and explained that the enhancement of his
sentence was "not based on the duration of the retention, but on
the fact of his continued retention of the children."7 Therefore,
the special condition for Ahmed's failure to return the children did
not violate the intent of the sentencing guidelines.77
Ahmed's third contention was that further imprisonment based
on his failure to return the children to the United States would
expose him to multiple punishments for the same offense, in
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Second Circuit
rejected this argument for two reasons. First, the court noted that
Ahmed's objection was not ripe.79 Second, the court explained
that the period of supervised release was part of the original
sentence; therefore, if Ahmed was returned to prison for failure to
abide by the terms of his supervised release, it would be in
71 United States v. Abrar, 58 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
72 Amer, I 10 F.3d at 883.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 884.
76 Id.
77 See id.
78 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 2 (Double Jeopardy Clause).
79 See Amer, 110 F.3d at 884.
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conjunction with this original sentence." Therefore, the court
found that the condition of supervised release did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause.8'
Additionally, Ahmed argued that the condition of the
supervised release was unfair and impossible for him to meet
because he not could return his children to the United States while
imprisoned.82 Therefore, Ahmed feared that he would be in
violation of the condition immediately upon his release from
prison." The Second Circuit also found this argument to be
premature. s' It pointed out that the district court had already
decided to give Ahmed a reasonable period of time after his
release from prison to bring the children back to the United
States." The Second Circuit also noted that the judge had the
power under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) "to modify or revoke the
conditions and term of supervised release to account for any
unforeseen or changed circumstance." '86
Ahmed's final argument against his criminal sentence involved
a perceived conflict between the special condition calling for the
return of the children to Mona and the Egyptian court order
awarding him custody of the children.7 The Second Circuit
clarified that the district court's order was not meant to resolve the
custody dispute between the Amers, but was intended to return the
children to their "status quo" position prior to the abduction." The
court stated that the effect of this ruling was to deny Ahmed the
"legal advantage [he gained] from the abduction to or retention in
80 See id.
81 See id. In a footnote, the Second Circuit also examined the possibility that
because the IPKCA punishes both "removals" and "retention" of children, the continued
wrongful retention of children following a criminal sentence for their removal might be
permitted under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 884 n.5 (citing United States v.
Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1994)).
82 See id. at 884.
83 See id.
94 See id.
85 See id.
86 Id.
87 See id. at 884-85.
88 Id. at 885.
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the country where the child[ren] [are] located. '8 9  Therefore,
regardless of his custody rights under Egyptian law and whether
they might conflict with the district court's order that he return the
children to the United States, the Second Circuit rejected this
argument because Ahmed "brought the children to Egypt (and
thereby obtained his claimed Egyptian custody rights) in violation
of United States law."
5. Substantial Interference with Administration of Justice
Pursuant to section 2J1.2(b)(2) of the sentencing guidelines,
Ahmed received a. three level sentence enhancement from the
district court for "substantial interference with the administration
of justice," based on his "self-help" removal of the children from
New York.9' Although Ahmed's actions were not specifically
listed in the sentencing guidelines as one constituting "substantial
interference with the administration of justice," the court found
that the factors listed within the guidelines were not all-inclusive.9
Despite the fact that Ahmed did not take the children out of the
United States during ongoing judicial proceedings, the court
determined that his action still substantially interfered with the
administration of justice because he "prevented proper legal
proceedings from occurring by taking matters completely outside
the purview of the administration of justice."93
The Second Circuit thereby rejected all of Ahmed's challenges
to the IPKCA and affirmed the rulings of the district court in all
respects.9
89 Id. (quoting Lynda R. Herring, Comment, Taking Away the Pawns:
International Parental Abduction & the Hague Convention, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 137, 147 (1994) (alteration in the original)). The Second Circuit noted that the
intent to "return to the status quo" was common to both the IPKCA and the Hague
Convention on Child Abduction. Id.
9 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See id.
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III. Legislative Response to the Problem of International
Parental Abductions
The problem of international parental child abductions began
long before Ahmed Amer decided to take his children away to
Egypt in early 1995."5 In response to this growing problem, both
domestic and international law makers enacted legislation aimed at
providing a legal means for parents to effectuate the return of their
children.96 The most recent measure taken by the United States
was the IPKCA, enacted in 1993."7 This section will explore the
relationship between prior laws addressing international parental
child abductions and the inception of the IPKCA.98 This section
will also examine the Hague Convention on Child Abduction,
which the United States adopted in 1988, and the Convention's
relationship to the IPKCA. 9
A. Legislative History of the IPKCA
In light of the growing problem of international parental
kidnappings and the gaps in the existing civil legal remedies
developed at both the domestic and international level,"° Congress
developed a solution: the International Parental Kidnapping
Crime Act."'
Congress recognized that the rate of international parental
abductions continued to increase despite the emergence of
domestic and international legal instruments aimed at solving the
problem. 10 2  The State Department reported 515 parental
95 See Herring, supra note 89, at 138 ("The need for a global solution to the
problem of international parental abduction had become urgent by the 1970s.").
96 See Passanante, supra note 3, at 679. The IPKCA is better understood in
relation to the legal instruments preceding it which also attempted to stop the practice of
international parental child abductions. For a bibliography on the legal responses to
international parental kidnapping, see Nancy Levit, International Family Law Annotated
Bibliography, 13 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIM. LAW. 313, 314-16 (1996).
97 See Passanante, supra note 3, at 679.
98 See infra notes 100-45 and accompanying text.
99 See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
100 See infra notes 130-45 and accompanying text.
101 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (1994).
102 See H.R. REP. No. 103-390, at 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2419,
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
kidnappings in 1992, up from 320 in 1987.03 The ineffectiveness
of prior laws was partially attributed to the weakness of their
enforcement mechanisms." Under previous laws, state
prosecutors could, "in theory," obtain Unlawful Flight to Avoid
Prosecution (UFAP) warrants from U.S. Attorneys to bring about
the return of a parental kidnapper. 5 However, in order to get the
UFAP warrants, state prosecutors had to agree to extradite the
abductor back to the United States.'l As House Report 390
pointed out, state prosecutors were generally reluctant to provide
the substantial funds needed in an international extradition case.
07
Furthermore, even when state prosecutors did obtain a UFAP
warrant, there was no guarantee that the warrant alone would
automatically force the return of the child or the abductor.'" As
the Report explained:
(1) the United States does not have extradition treaties with all
countries; (2) many countries with whom we have extradition
treaties will not extradite their own nationals; (3) unlawful
flight to avoid prosecution is not, itself, an extraditable offense;
and, (4) the underlying state offense of child abduction is often
not an extraditable offense.' 9
Although the Hague Convention on Child Abduction provided for
international cooperation to overcome some of these difficulties,
its effectiveness was curtailed by the limited number of signatory
countries. "0
Mindful of the need to curb the international kidnapping
problem,"' Congress promulgated the International Parental
2419.
103 See id. at 2419-20.
104 See id. at 2420.
105 See id. at 2420-21.
106 See id. at 2421.
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 Id.
110 See id. ("[M]ost countries are not signatories to the Convention, thus leaving
individual countries to take whatever legal unilateral action they can to obtain the return
of abducted children.").
"I See id. at 2419-20 ("Some child psychologists believe that the trauma children
suffer from these abductions is one of the worst forms of child abuse.").
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Kidnapping Crime Act of 1993. By making the practice of
international child kidnapping a federal offense, Congress hoped
to overcome the limitations of the prior legal remedies."' First, the
IPKCA gives the federal government direct power to request
extradition of the parent, provided the parent is within a country
with which the United States has an extradition treaty.'1 3 Second,
because the act is a federal crime, the IPKCA creates an additional
deterrent to potential international parental kidnappers."" Third,
Congress hoped that foreign governments would be more likely to
assist U.S. diplomats (as opposed to state prosecutors) in returning
children to the United States under the force of a federal warrant."5
Finally, foreign nations would receive a clear message of the
"gravity with which the United States views these cases."" 6 In
summation, by enacting the IPKCA, Congress attempted to deter
the practice of international parental kidnappings and to effectively
bring about the return of abducted children and their parents to the
United States.
B. The Mechanics of the IPKCA
The IPKCA makes international parental kidnapping a federal
offense."7 The Act is divided into four sub-sections that explain:
what constitutes an act of international parental abduction; what
constitutes a "child" and "parental rights" under the statute; the
affirmative defenses available; and the relationship of the IPKCA
to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction (Hague Convention on Child Abduction)." 8
Section 1204(a) provides that anyone who removes a child
from the United States or retains a child outside the United States
intending to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights can face
112 See id at 2421.
113 See id
114 See id.
I' See id.
116 Id.
117 The IPKCA was added to Chapter 55, Title 18 of the United States Code,
section 1204, making international parental kidnapping a federal offense.
"18 See 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (1994); see also infra notes 130-37 and accompanying
text (discussing the Hague Convention on Child Abduction).
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both fines and imprisonment for up to three years." 9 Section
1204(b)(1) defines "child" as a person under the age of sixteen,
and § 1204(b)(2) defines "parental rights" as joint or sole custody
rights, including rights to visitation, and those rights arising under
operation of law, court order, or legally binding agreement of the
parties. 20 House Report 390 explained that "parental rights" are
"to be determined by reference to State law, in accordance with the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Parental
Child Abduction."''
A defendant may assert three affirmative defenses pursuant to
Section 1204(c).' The first is that the defendant acted pursuant to
a valid court order granting legal rights, obtained under the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and in effect at the time
of the offense. 123  The second affirnative defense applies to
situations where the defendant was fleeing an incident or pattern of
domestic violence.2 4 The third applies when the defendant already
has court-ordered custody or visitation rights and simply fails to
return the child due to circumstances beyond his or her control.'
This third affirmative defense is contingent upon the defendant
having both notified, or made reasonable attempts to notify, the
other parent or lawful custodian within twenty-four hours after the
expiration of the visitation period and returned the child as soon as
possible. 6
Finally, section 1204(d) provides that nothing in the IPKCA is
to detract from the Hague Convention on Child Abduction.2 ' The
"Sense of Congress" accompanying the Act explains:
It is the sense of the Congress that, inasmuch as use of the
procedures under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
119 See id. § 1204(a).
120 See id. § 1204(b).
121 H.R. REP. No. 103-390, at 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2419,
2422.
122 See 18 U.S.C. § 1204(c).
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See id. § 1204(d).
(Vol. 23
1998] INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL KIDNAPPING CRIME ACT 421
International Parental Child Abduction has resulted in the return
of many children, those procedures, in circumstances in which
they are applicable, should be the option of first choice for a
parent who seeks the return of a child who has been removed
from the parent."'
Congress thus codified its intention that in situations where
remedies are available under the Hague Convention on Child
Abduction, those civil remedies must be utilized first."9
C. The Hague Convention on Child Abduction
As divorce rates grew in the United States, so too did incidents
of child abductions. 3  In response to the growing problem,
Congress passed two statutes: the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, which attempted to assist in the enforcement of
custody decrees between states;' and the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act, which made domestic parental kidnappings a
federal offense.3 2  Despite these legislative efforts, it remained
difficult to address international parental abductions at the
domestic level.'33 The United States, therefore, adopted the Hague
Convention on Child .Abduction.34  This Convention was
implemented in the United States under the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) in 1988.'
The Hague Convention on Child Abduction is a civil remedy
aimed at effectuating the return of internationally abducted
128 International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act, § 2(b), Pub. L. No. 103-173, 107
Stat. 1998, (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (1994)).
129 See id. The Act also provides $250,000 for national, regional, and state
programs for training and education for criminal and civil aspects of international
parental child abductions. See id. § 3.
130 See Passanante, supra note 3, at 680.
131 See Susan L. Barone, International Parental Child Abduction: A Global
Dilemma with Limited Relief-Can Something More be Done?, 8 N.Y. INT'L L. R.Ev. 95,
98 (1995).
132 See Passanante, supra note 3, at 684.
133 See Herring, supra note 89, at 145-46.
134 See id. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction was unanimously adopted by the twenty-three nations present for the Hague
Conference on Private International Law in 1980. See id. at 138 n.8.
135 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-10 (1994); see also Barone, supra note 131, at 103.
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children. 136  Furthermore, the Hague Convention on Child
Abduction was not designed as a means for determining custody
rights between parents; instead, "[p]arties to the Hague
Convention are expected to promptly return an abducted child to
his country of 'habitual residence' without addressing the merits of
the competing parental claims.'
137
As the Second Circuit noted in Amer, the limited number of
signatory nations to the Hague Convention on Child Abduction
curtails its effectiveness. Because the Hague Convention on Child
Abduction only applies between signatory countries, there are a
significant number of countries which serve as "safe havens" for
international parental abductors. The problems presented by these
"safe" nations were highlighted in two cases cited in Amer:
Mohsen v. Mohsen38 and Mezo v. Elmergawi1
39
In Mohsen, the Mohsens' daughter habitually resided in
Bahrain before Mrs. Mohsen removed her to the United States and
refused to allow her husband to visit the child.'"o The district court
first looked at the language of the Convention, which states that it
"shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a
contracting state immediately before any breach of custody or
access rights.' 14' The court ruled that Mr. Mohsen did not have a
remedy under the Hague Convention on Child Abduction because
Bahrain was not a signatory country to the Hague Convention.
42
In Mezo, Mrs. Mezo's children were allegedly taken by her
husband from the United States to Egypt, and then eventually to
Libya.'43 The district court, like the court in Mohsen, pointed out
that remedies under the Hague Convention on Child Abduction
136 See Passanante, supra note 3, at 690. "[I]t is important to recognize that the
drafters quickly and explicitly rejected any mention of criminal sanctions, choosing
instead to address the civil aspects of abduction[s] ... ." Id.
137 Herring, supra note 89, at 140.
138 715 F. Supp. 1063 (D. Wyo. 1989).
139 855 F. Supp. 59 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
140 See Mohsen, 715 F. Supp. at 1064-65.
141 Id. at 1065 (quoting Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, Oct. 1980, chap. II, art. IV (alteration in original)).
142 See id.
143 See Mezo, 855 F. Supp. at 61.
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were available only "when the child is wrongfully removed from a
signatory country and retained in another signatory country."'"
Therefore, because neither Libya nor Egypt were signatory
countries to the Convention, the court (reluctantly) dismissed Mrs.
Mezo's complaint for lack ofjurisdiction.' 4
D. Amer's Analysis of the Claim that IPKCA Incorporates the
Hague Convention on Child Abduction Defenses
In Amer, the Second Circuit utilized basic statutory
interpretation and an analysis of the relationship between the
IPKCA and the Hague Convention on Child Abduction to defeat
the notion that Hague Convention affirmative defenses should
apply to IPKCA prosecutions. The Second Circuit pointed out
that the IPKCA explicitly lists three, and only three, affirmative
defenses, which suggests that this list is exhaustive.'" The Second
Circuit also examined the history of the Hague Convention on
Child Abduction and its relationship to the IPKCA in responding
to Ahmed's argument that he should be provided Hague
Convention defenses. The court concluded that section 1204(d),
which states that the IPKCA is not to detract from the Hague
Convention on Child Abduction, addressed situations where both
IPKCA and Hague Convention remedies were available.
Therefore, if the child was abducted from one signatory state to
another signatory state, the civil mechanisms of the Hague
Convention on Child Abduction should be the first resort.
147
This conclusion is consistent with the statement in the "Sense
of Congress" which accompanied the Act.'" Because the IPKCA
was enacted in response to the deficiency of protection under the
prior domestic and international civil mechanisms, 49 it is contrary
144 Id. at 63.
145 See id. The court stated that "it is a tragic circumstance when, despite two valid
court orders, a mother is unable to regain the lawful custody of her two minor children,
or to even see her children, by reason of the unlawful conduct of their father." Id.
'4 See Amer, 110 F.3d at 881.
147 See id. at 882.
14 See id.; International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act § 2(b), Pub. L. No. 103-
173, 107 Stat. 1998, (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (1994)).
149 See H.R. REP. No. 103-390, at 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2419,
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to the intent underlying the enactment of the IPKCA to allow a
defendant to rely on the Hague Convention on Child Abduction
defenses when a frustrated parent is unable to use its affiimative
mechanisms to fight for the return of his or her child.150
IV. Challenge to the IPKCA Based on its Vagueness
A. Background Law
In examining whether a law is void for vagueness, courts look
at three factors: whether a constitutional right is being
challenged,' 5' whether the action of the party challenging the law
was clearly proscribed by the law,5 2 and whether the law is so
vague as to allow arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.'53
In Village of Hoffinan Estates v. Flipside,5 4 the appellee
argued that a city ordinance which required its business to obtain a
license before it sold any items that were "designed or marketed
for use with illegal cannabis or drugs" was invalid for being
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.'55 In examining his
challenge, the Supreme Court utilized a two-part analysis. First,
the Court asked whether the law affected constitutionally protected
conduct.'56 If so, it would apply a stricter standard in its test for
vagueness;'57 if not, the Court would only strike down the law if it
was vague in all of its applications.'58
In Hoffman Estates, the Court also reiterated that it has
"expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than
2422.
150 The Second Circuit did leave open the possible scenario where both civil Hague
proceedings and criminal IPKCA proceedings are initiated simultaneously. In such a
case, the court intimated that there may be a possibility for a parent to utilize the civil
Hague defenses in his or her criminal IPKCA case, but the court did not elaborate on
this implication. SeeAmer, 110 F.3d at 881.
151 See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982).
152 See id. at 495.
'53 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
154 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
155 Id. at491.
156 See id. at 494.
157 See id. at 499.
15s See id. at 495.
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criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are
qualitatively less severe."'59  The Court concluded that the
ordinance in question was not vague when applied to the
complainant's business; therefore, he could not challenge the
ordinance because it did not "reach any constitutionally protected
conduct and was reasonably clear in its application to the
complainant."' 6
In Kolender v. Lawson, 6' the Court struck down a law which it
found to be unconstitutionally vague in all its applications. The
law in question was a California statute requiring people found
loitering in the streets to provide "credible and reliable"
identification and to account for why they were present in the area
if questioned by a police officer. 62  The Court emphasized that
"[t]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute
define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.' ' 163  The Court found the California statute
unconstitutionally vague, emphasizing the risk of arbitrary
enforcement in the absence of more specific standards defining
what exactly is "credible and reliable" identification.'"
In order to prevail in challenging a statute for vagueness,
therefore, it must be established that the statute is
unconstitutionally vague in all of its classifications, at the risk of
arbitrary enforcement. If the conduct is readily proscribed by the
statute, then the facial challenge will not succeed.
159 Id. at 498-99.
160 Id. at 505.
161 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
162 See id. at 353.
163 Id. at 357.
'64 See id. at 361. In his dissent, Justice White felt there would be some situations
where the statute would not be vague in application, for example, when a person refused
to give identification of any kind; however, because it would not be vague in all
situations, he would not strike the whole statute down. See id. at 370 (White, J.,
dissenting).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
B. Second Circuit's Analysis of Amer's Vagueness Challenge
The Second Circuit's response to Ahmed Amer's "void for
vagueness" argument properly relied on Hoffman Estates.6 While
in Hoffman Estates, the Supreme Court concluded that an
ordinance's capacity for vagueness was not important because the
law clearly proscribed the appellee's own actions,'6 the Second
Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Amer.67 Although the
court conceded that some of the language in the IPKCA, namely
"retains" and the phrase "has been in the United States," might not
be clear in every conceivable situation, because Ahmed's actions
were undoubtedly proscribed by the Act, the court held that he
could not challenge them on the basis of their vagueness.'"
The Second Circuit's conclusion on the void for vagueness
issue is reinforced by distinguishing Kolender, which explained
the importance of striking down facially vague statutes which
might be arbitrarily enforced. 69 Based on the time and expense
involved in pursuing a case of international parental kidnapping,'
70
the risk of arbitrary enforcement of the IPKCA seems
unimaginable. Moreover, as the Second Circuit found, the IPKCA
withstood Ahmed's challenge of being void for vagueness,
because his own actions were clearly proscribed by the law, and,
165 See Amer, 110 F.3d at 878 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455
U.S. 489, 502 (1982)).
166 See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 502 (1982).
167 See Amer, 110 F.3d at 878.
168 See id. There is a strong argument that the IPKCA statute indicates more about
the meaning of the term "retains" than the Second Circuit's analysis indicated. One of
the affirmative defenses under the IPKCA involves a situation where a parent is unable
to return the child at the end of his or her legal period of visiting or custody rights due to
circumstances beyond his or her control. To qualify for the protection of the affirmative
defense, the parent with the child must inform the other parent of the difficulty within 24
hours and return the child as soon as possible. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1204(c)(3) (1994).
This seems to suggest a very small window of time before the retention of a child
becomes wrongful; therefore, "retaining" a child seems to mean keeping the child away
from the other parent for any period of time beyond that which is legally allotted.
169 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
170 See, e.g., Richard Shelby, National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,
Government Press Release,. July 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12101826 ("Many
international abduction cases can take years for a parent to work their [sic] way through
the diplomatic and legal channels in order to retrieve their [sic] child.").
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thus, there was no risk of arbitrary enforcement in his case.'
71
However, like the Supreme Court in Hoffman Estates, the
Second Circuit in Amer left open the possibility of other
challenges to the LPKCA based on vagueness. 72 In Hoffman
Estates, the Supreme Court stated that, although the potential
ambiguities of the provisions were not important to the case,
"further guidelines, administrative rules, or enforcement policy"
might serve to clarify the scope of the law.7 1 In Amer, the Second
Circuit also suggested that there would be rare instances where the
term "retains" and the phrase "has been in the United States"
might be more readily contested.74 This is important because due
to the suggestion regarding the potentially vague terms in the
IPKCA, Congress may possibly want to respond with statutory
clarification.
V. Constitutional Challenge to the IPKCA Based on the Free
Exercise Clause
A. Background Law
Under the First Amendment, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . .,,17 The contemporary rules for determining
whether a law violates the Free Exercise Clause were established
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith 76 and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah,77 cases which were both cited in Amer.
In Smith, the respondents were fired from their jobs because
they ingested peyote during a sacramental ceremony at the Native
American Church. 178  They applied for unemployment
"'1 See Amer, 110 F.3d at 879.
172 See id. at 878.
173 Village of Hoffman v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 502 (1982).
174 SeeAmer, I10 F.3d at 878.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
176 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
'7 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
178 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
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compensation from the Employment Division, but were rejected
because they had been fired due to work-related misconduct.'
The Court first examined whether the religious use of peyote was
permissible under the Free Exercise Clause. It explained that
"[w]e have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate."'80 The Court emphasized
the necessity of the government's power to enforce generally
applicable prohibitions designed to protect against socially
harmful misconduct."8 ' The majority declined to use a "compelling
government interest" standard in reviewing government actions
which were neutral and of general applicability, even if the rule
had the effect of burdening a religious practice.8 2 The majority
concluded that the prohibition against ingesting. peyote under
Oregon law was constitutional and consistent with the Free
Exercise Clause.'83 Therefore, the employment commission did
not wrongly deny the respondents' unemployment
compensation.'
The Supreme Court also examined the protections of the Free
Exercise Clause in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
179 See id.
180 Id. at 878-79. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed that the
majority set out the proper issue to be determined; that is, the question of whether the
State could deny the unemployment benefits depended on whether the State could
crirninalize the underlying conduct. See id. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
181 See id. at 885.
182 See id. at 888. Both Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion and Justice
Blackmun in his dissent believed that the "compelling interest" test should be used when
examining the constitutionality of a state statute which burdens the free exercise of
religion. See id. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 907
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
183 See id. at 890.
184 See id. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun argued, under a "compelling interest"
standard, that the State's interest was not in a broad "war on drugs," but rather that the
State merely had a narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the religious,
ceremonial use of peyote, and that the harm from such use was only speculative because
there was no evidence that the religious use of peyote had harmed anyone in the past.
See id. at 909-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Therefore, the State's interest was not
"sufficiently compelling to outweigh the respondents' right to the free exercise of their
religion." Id. at 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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of Hialeah.' The religious practices at issue in this case were
those of the Santeria religion, a mixture of traditional African
religion with elements of Roman Catholicism."6 Many Santeria
rituals, including birth, death, and marriage rituals, involved
animal sacrifices.' Apparently in trepidation of this new religion
in Hialeah, the city council enacted a number of ordinances
prohibiting religious animal sacrifices".'8 The ordinances were
challenged as violating free exercise rights of the people practicing
the Santeria religion.'89
The Court followed Smith, writing that "our cases establish the
general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a
particular religious practice."'" The majority explained that "we
need not define with precision the standard used to evaluate
whether a prohibition is of general application, for' these
ordinances fall well below the minimum standard necessary to
protect First Amendment rights."'' While the city argued that the
ordinance was meant to protect public health and prevent cruelty
to animals, the Court found the ordinances underinclusive for such
purposes.'92 The Court concluded that the ordinances were only
directed toward conduct motivated by religious belief' The
Court then professed that "[a] law burdening religious practice that
is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most
rigorous of scrutiny."' 94 The Court explained why the ordinances
in question did not pass such strict scrutiny: "[E]ven were the
governmental interests compelling, the ordinances are not drawn
185 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
186 See id. at 524-25.
187 See id. at 525.
188 See id. at 526-27.
189 See id. at 523.
190 Id. at 531 (quoting Employment Div., Dep'.t of Human Resources. of Or. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990)).
19' Id. at 543.
192 See id.
193 See id. at 545.
194 Id.'at 546.
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in narrow terms to accomplish those interests .... The absence of
narrow tailoring suffices to establish the invalidity of the
ordinances."'95  Moreover, the Court found that a compelling
governmental interest had not been shown because the ordinance
attacked conduct protected by the First Amendment without
addressing other conduct which produced the same harm."9
In a concurrence in Smith, Justice Souter questioned the
legitimacy of the majority's holding in Smith in light of the
precedent.'97 He pointed out that "[n]ot long before the Smith
decision, indeed, the Court specifically rejected the argument that
'neutral and uniform' requirements . need satisfy only a
reasonableness standard."'98  Instead, Souter believed that a
"compelling interest" test should be used to see if there is a
compelling governmental interest to justify a substantial burden
placed on a religious belief or practice. 99
Thus, despite some disagreement on the Court, Smith and
Church of Lukumi Babalu produced the following test: if a law is
neutral and generally applicable, it does not need to be analyzed
under a "compelling government interest" test, even if its effect is
to burden a religious belief or practice.
B. Second Circuit's Analysis ofAmer's Free Exercise
Challenge
In examining whether the IPKCA could violate the Free
Exercise Clause,2°° the Second Circuit relied on the test from
Smith.2O' The court found that the IPKCA was a neutral law of
195 Id.
196 See id. at 546-47.
197 See id. at 565 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
198 Id. at 565 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fl., 480 U.S.
136, 141 (1987)) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
199 See id. at 565 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Blackmun also believed that the compelling interest test should be used. See id.
at 578 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
200 Although Ahmed forfeited his ability to contest the IPKCA as violating his Free
Exercise rights because he failed to raise the challenge until appeal, because this was an
issue of constitutional importance, the Second Circuit examined whether the IPKCA
could violate the Free Exercise Clause. See Amer, 110 F.3d at 879.
201 See id.
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general applicability,"' meant for prosecuting any person who
removes a child from the United States with the "intent to obstruct
the lawful exercise of parental rights."23  Even if the Supreme
Court returned to the "compelling interest" test advocated by the
minority opinions in Smith and Lukumi Babalu, the IPKCA should
survive. The United States' strong interest in making sure that
children are not kidnapped by parents and taken out of the country
is apparent in the legislative history of the IPKCA,24 and is an
interest compelling enough to justify any incidental burdens on
religious practice.
VI. Criminal Sentencing Under the IPKCA
A. Background Law
The IPKCA is a criminal law which imposes fines and/or
imprisonment of up to three years on convicted international
parental kidnappers.2 5 18 U.S.C. § 3553 governs the imposition of
sentences for Title 18 offenses, including international parental
kidnapping, and § 3553(a) enumerates several factors to be
considered in imposing a criminal sentence."'
1. Special Conditions of Supervised Release
Criminal sentences may include, and in some instances must
include, periods of supervised release, governed by 18 U.S.C.
202 See id.
203 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (1994).
204 See H.R. REP. No. 103-390, at 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2419,
2422 ("The [IPKCA bill] is intended to deter the removal of children from the United
States to foreign countries in order to obstruct parental rights.").
205 See 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (1994).
206 See id. § 3553(a). The factors a court is required to consider include the nature
of the offense and the history of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to
reflect the seriousness of the crime, afford deterrence, protect the public from the
defendant, and to provide the defendant with a chance for rehabilitation; the kinds of
sentences available; the permissible sentencing range established by the Sentencing
Commission; the need to avoid sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and the need to provide
restitution to any victims of the defendant. See id.
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§ 3583 (1994).207 Section 3583(c) enumerates certain factors
which courts should consider when imposing a period of
supervised release, including: (1) "the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant";
(2) the need for the sentence to provide deterrence; (3) protection
of the public; (4) the training and correctional treatment' for the
offender; (5) the range of sentencing available; (6) the Sentencing
Commission's policy in effect at the time of sentencing; and
(7) the need to avoid disparities in sentencing.2 8 Section 3583(d)
lists conditions of supervised release which are required for certain
offenses, and also provides that a court may impose "any other
condition it considers to be appropriate," provided that the
condition relates to certain factors2 9 and "involves no greater
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the
purposes" given.21 Section 3583(e) allows a court to: revoke the
term of supervised release if it is warranted by the conduct of the
defendant and the interest of justice;'" extend the term or reduce,
modify or enlarge the conditions of the supervised release;212
revoke the term of supervised release if the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the
conditions of his supervised release;2 3. or keep the defendant under
"home arrest" instead of incarceration.21
4
Sentencing guidelines sections 5Dl.1 through 5D1.3 deal
specifically with the duration of supervised release.215  Section
207 A supervised release period is very similar to parole. "Under each, a defendant
serves a portion of a sentence in prison and a portion under supervision outside prison
walls. If a defendant violates the terms of his release, he may be incarcerated once more
under the terms of his original sentence." United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 881
(9th Cir. 1993).
208 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (1994).
209 Id. § 3583(d). The factors to be considered are listed under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553
(a)(1), (a)(2)(B) to (D). See id.
210 Id. The purposes are those under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D) (1994). See
id.
211 See id. § 3583(e)(1).
212 See id. § 3583(e)(2).
213 See id. § 3583(e)(3).
214 See id. § 3583(e)(4).
215 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5DI.I-5DI.3 (1989). Section
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5D1.3 governs the conditions of supervised release. ' Section
5D1.3(b) allows the court to impose its own conditions of
supervised release, provided that the conditions are reasonably
related to:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant, and (2) the need for the
sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct, to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant, and to provide the defendant with needed .. .
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment ....217
These conditions are identical to some of the factors identified
under 18 U.S.C. § 3583."'
As the statutes and sentencing guidelines indicate, courts may
use their discretion in determining appropriate conditions of
supervised release. The extent to which a court can exercise this
discretion was examined by the Second Circuit in United States v.
Abrar 19 In this case, the district court imposed a sentence of
supervised release on the defendant Abrar, under the special
condition that Abrar repay his personal debts. 0 The court's only
justification for the special condition was its belief that Abrar had
"no right to [take money from people]. ' ' '
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that "[s]entencing courts
have broad discretion to tailor conditions of supervised release to
the goals and purposes outlined in section 5D1. 3 (b).' 'm However,
the Second Circuit qualified this discretion, warning that courts are
not given power of "untrammeled discretion. 2 23  The Second
5D1.1(a) provides that a court must order a term of supervised release following
imprisonment if the sentence is longer than one year. Section 5D 1.1(b) also allows a
court to order a term of supervised release following imprisonment in any other case.
Section 5D 1.2 prescribes the length of supervised release terms, which depends on the
class of felony for which the defendant was convicted. See id. §§ 5D1.I-5D1.2.
216 See id. § 5DI.3.
217 Id. § 5DI.3(b).
218 See supra note 206 and supra note 208 and accompanying text.
219 58 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1995).
220 See id. at 45.
22 Id. at 46.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 47.
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Circuit found no adequate connection between the condition for
Abrar's release and any of the factors enumerated in the statutes
and sentencing guidelinesY4 It pointed out that the only rationale
the district court provided for the condition was a sense of
indignation that Abrar was not repaying his debts.25 Furthermore,
the court suggested that Abrar might actually renew his criminal
activity in order to be able to pay his mandated debt.226 Therefore,
the Second Circuit concluded that the district court abused its
discretion in imposing the condition that Abrar repay his personal
debts as part of his supervised release.2"
As the statutes and sentencing guidelines set out and the case
law confirms, courts have the ability to impose "special
conditions" for a defendant's period of supervised release,
provided that the conditions relate to the factors specified in
section 5D1.3 and the court does not abuse its discretion in
determining the appropriate conditions.
2. Special Conditions and Double Jeopardy
A defendant who violates the terms of his or her specially
conditioned supervised release can be returned to prison. Courts
will uphold this further imprisonment because it is the original
sentence being acted upon and not an imposition of a new criminal
sentence; therefore, it is not a violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.22
This characterization of supervised release as part of the
original sentence is illustrated in United States v. Paskow.229 In
this case, Paskow's supervised release was revoked and he was
returned to prison for twelve months."' However, the conditions
which prompted the revocation arose under an amendment to the
supervised release statute which was promulgated after he
224 See id.
2 See id.
226 See id.
227 See id.
228 See United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 1995).
229 11 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993).
230 See id. at 876, 883.
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received his original sentence.Y' Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held
that the revocation of Paskow's supervised release violated the ex
post facto clause of the Constitution.232 The court explained that
"[t]he supervised release statute... makes it clear that the terms
and conditions of supervised release are a part of the sentence."2'3
The Ninth Circuit concluded that because the violation of a
condition of supervised release is not treated as a new and separate
substantive offense, imposition of a new rule created after the
original sentencing violated ex post facto principles.3
The Ninth Circuit upheld this characterization of supervised
release in United States v. Soto-Olivas.235 The circumstances of
this case differed from Paskow, but the underlying rationale of
conditioned releases remained consistent. In Soto-Olivas, the
defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment followed by
six years of supervised release.236 Part of his conditioned release
was the directive not to return to the United States illegally if
deported by INS.23 Soto-Olivas was deported, but he returned to
the United States, and eight months after his release he was
arrested for auto theft.238  Soto-Olivas was sentenced to seven
months imprisonment for returning to the United States illegally,
in violation of a condition of his supervised release.2 39 Then, on
the day he was to be released from this period of imprisonment,
Soto-Olivas was indicted under a separate statute which made it
illegal to reenter the United States after being deported for an
aggravated felony.240
231 See id.
232 See id
233 Id. at 882 (quoting language in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (1994) stating: "The court,
in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for a felony or misdemeanor, may
include as part of the sentence the requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of
supervised release after imprisonment .... ") (emphasis in the original).
234 See id. at 883.
235 44 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 1995).
236 See id. at 789.
237 See id.
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 See id.
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Soto-Olivas argued .that this indictment violated his rights
under the Double Jeopardy Clause24' because it punished him twice
for the same act, his illegal reentry into the United States.242 As in
Paskow, the Ninth Circuit explained, "By the plain language of the
[supervised release] statute, supervised release, although imposed
in addition to the period of incarceration, is 'a part of the
sentence."' 43 Therefore, if a defendant is returned to prison for
violating the terms of his supervised release, he is being punished
under his original sentence.2 " The Ninth Circuit concluded that
Soto-Olivas could be indicted for illegal reentry into the United
States under the statute without violating the Double Jeopardy
Clause, even though that same illegal reentry resulted in
imprisonment after the revocation of his supervised release.24'
3. Modification/lWithdrawal of a Condition
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), conditions of supervised
release may also be modified or withdrawn after the original
sentencing.24 The Second Circuit applied this provision in United
States v. Lussier,2 47 where it upheld a modification of the
defendant's supervised release.2 The court explained that 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) "requires the court, as it decides whether or
how to modify the conditions of supervised release, to consider
many of the same factors that it is required to consider in
originally imposing a sentence upon a convicted defendant,"2 49
including "general punishment issues such as deterrence, public
safety, rehabilitation, proportionality, and consistency." '  The
court explained that new, unforeseen, or changed circumstances
could make the original term of supervised release either too harsh
241 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
242 See Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d at 789.
243 Id. at 790 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (1994)).
244 See id. (citing United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 1993)).
245 See id. at 792.
2 See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
247 104 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 1997).
248 See id. at 34.
249 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) (1994)).
230 Id. at 35.
[Vol. 23
INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL KIDNAPPING CRIME AcT
or inappropriate for the goals it was meant to serve.25" ' Although
Lussier was unsuccessful in-his challenge, the Second Circuit did
uphold the ability of courts to modify terms of supervised
release.252
4. Enhancement for Interference with the Administration
of Justice
Part J of the sentencing guidelines deals with offenses
involving the administration of justice."' Under section
2J1.2(b)(2), if the offense resulted in the substantial interference
with the administration of justice, the offense level is to be
increased by three levels.254 The notes following section 2J1.2
characterize the actions and offenses which might constitute
"substantial interference with the administration of justice."255
These include "premature or improper termination of a felony
investigation; an indictment, verdict, or any judicial determination
based upon perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence; or the
unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court
resources." 25 6 While both the application notes and background
information accompanying this section list some offenses or
activities which might constitute substantial interference with the
administration of justice, they do not indicate that the list of
examples is intended to be exhaustive.257
B. Analysis ofAmer's Challenge to the IPKCA Based on its
Criminal Sentencing Provisions
1. Imposition of the Special Condition
The Second Circuit upheld the district court's imposition of a
special condition of supervised release, which required Amer to
return the children to the United States. The Congressional history
251 See id. at 36.
252 See id.
253 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL, Part J (1989).
254 See id. § 2J1.2(b)(2).
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 See id.
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of the IPKCA lists deterrence and the ability to bring children back
to the United States as aims of the new criminal penalty.25 The
Second Circuit agreed that the conditioned release in Amer's
sentence helped implement these objectives.259
Statutory authority allows the imposition of special conditions
of supervised release,2 60 and the decision in United States v. Abrar
upheld the authority of a district court to exercise discretion in
imposing special conditions of supervised release.26' In Amer, the
Second Circuit distinguished Abrar, however, where it had held
that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a condition
that was not related to the nature of the offense nor to the need to
further deter the defendant's criminal conduct.262 In contrast, the
district court in Amer imposed a condition which related to the
nature of Ahmed Amer's offense and served the need to deter the
criminal conduct. 263  The Second Circuit found that the district
court had been mindful of the nature of Amer's offense-child
abduction-and the need to deter such kidnappings, not only in
this particular situation, but in all potential situations involving
parental abductors.2"6 Therefore, the actions of the district court in
Amer were correctly distinguished from the abuse of discretion
seen in Abrar, and the Second Circuit concluded that the special
condition of returning abducted children as part of a supervised
release under the IPKCA was proper.265
2. Double Jeopardy
The Second Circuit relied on several Ninth Circuit decisions
involving imprisonment following the revocation of supervised
release and held that the potential return to prison was still under
258 See H.R. REP. No. 103-390, at 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2419,
2422.
259 See Amer, 110 F.3d at 883.
260 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (1994).
261 See United States v. Abrar, 58 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1995); see also supra notes
219-27 and accompanying text.
262 See Amer, 110 F.3d at 883.
263 See id.
264 See id.
265 See id.
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the auspices of the original sentence.266 In both of the cases cited
by the Second Circuit, United States v. Paskow267 and United
States v. Soto-Olivas,2m the Ninth Circuit explained that supervised
releases are part and parcel of the original sentence and that the
revocation of the release occurs under the directive of the first
sentence. 269 Therefore, the Second Circuit concluded that the
revocation of a supervised release and a subsequent return to
prison does not constitute double jeopardy.270
Furthermore, as the Amer court noted in a footnote, the Second
Circuit had previously ruled that "because a revocation proceeding
is 'not a proceeding designed to punish a criminal defendant for
violation of a criminal law,"' 2' the defendant may be returned to
prison for the supervised-release violation and be prosecuted
criminally "for the same conduct without implicating principles of
double jeopardy.",212  This suggestion is similar to the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Soto-Olivas rejecting the defendant's claim
that the Double Jeopardy Clause had been violated.273 In that case,
the defendant was imprisoned after the revocation of his
supervised release and was then charged for a separate criminal
offense arising out of the same activity which caused the
revocation of his supervised release.274 In Amer, the Second
Circuit noted that under a similar principle, Ahmed could
conceivably be prosecuted for a new offense of retaining his
children in Egypt, since his first sentence was only for the removal
and retention up to August 4, 1995.275
Although it is true that the IPKCA treats the removal of a child
266 See id. at 884.
267 l1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993).
268 44 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 1995).
269 See Paskow, 11 F.3d at 882; Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d at 790.
270 See Amer, 110 F.3d at 884.
271 United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting United
States v. Hanahan, 798 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1986)).
272 Id.
273 See Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d at 792.
274 See id.
275 See Amer, 110 F.3d at 884 n.5.
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and the retention of a child as two separate actions,276 this
hypothetical situation is somewhat distinguishable from the facts
which the Second Circuit examined in Soto-Olivas. In Soto-
Olivas, the defendant's condition of supervised release was not as
directly related to his specific offense as was Ahmed Amer's
condition. The condition of Soto-Olivas' release was that he not
return to the United States illegally, which while satisfying the
criteria for an appropriate condition of supervised release, did not
directly relate to the offense of distributing drugs for which he was
sentenced.277 Therefore, the revocation and subsequent criminal
indictment for auto theft was completely removed from his
original conviction for illegal reentry to the United States.278 In
contrast, Ahmed's condition of supervised release called on him to
end the practice which led to his imprisonment in the first place,
by returning his children to their mother in the United States. 9
Therefore, if Ahmed failed to bring the children back and was
returned to prison in a revocation of the release, it would be
because he retained the children past August 5, 1995."' Arguably,
if Ahmed then received a new sentence for retaining his children
in Egypt, the situation might not fit within the precedent
established in Soto-Olivas.
Despite potential future arguments that a separate sentence for
retaining the children might violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,
the Second Circuit's suggestion of repeated sentencing might be
enough to entice Ahmed into bringing the children back. In this
way, the IPKCA has an even stronger chance of becoming a true
solution to the problem of international abductions than prior
legislation.
3. Impossibility
As noted by the Second Circuit, the provisions in the
276 Section 1204 of the IPKCA provides: "Whoever -removes a child from the
United States or retains a child ... outside the United States .... " 18 U.S.C. § 1204
(1994).
277 See Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d at 789.
278 See id.
279 See Amer, 110 F.3d at 884.
280 See id.
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supervised release statute which allow for the modification and
revocation of conditions of supervised release basically silenced
any argument Ahmed Amer could make regarding the
impossibility of returning the children in accordance with his
supervised release condition. 281' However, Ahmed did raise
practical considerations, including the potential difficulty the
imprisoned abducting parent might have in returning children who
reside in foreign countries.282
In light of the problems with parental abductions prior to the
IPKCA, including the expense involved in returning the
children,283 imprisoning the parent responsible for the abduction
might frustrate the intended purpose of the statute: bringing the
abducted children back to the United States. In Ahmed's case, he
will be imprisoned for two years before the special condition of his
sentence even becomes applicable. By that time, the children
might have become settled in Egypt and would then have to face
another disruption in being returned to America. Therefore, while
the return of the children may not be legally "impossible," the
further trauma which it could produce for the children might
present an even more insurmountable, non-legal "impossibility."
4. Conflict with Egyptian Order
The Second Circuit explained that the district court's
imposition of a supervised release, conditioned on Ahmed
returning the children to the United States, adhered to the IPKCA
and the Hague Convention on Child Abduction because it called
for the return of the children to their "status quo" position without
deciding the underlying custody dispute.284 Under the IPKCA, a
parent's removal of a child is only an offense if it obstructs the
lawful exercise of "parental rights;" therefore, the custody or
visitation rights to the child must exist separate from the IPKCA
provisions.285 As the Second Circuit pointed out, at the time Amer
281 See id.
282 See id.
283 See Merritt McKeon, International Parental Kidnapping: A New Law, a New
Solution, 30 FAM. L.Q. 235, 237 (1996).
284 See Amer, 110 F.3d at 885.
285 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1204(a), (b)(2) (1994).
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removed the children, he did not have the Egyptian custody order,
and his obtaining the custody order occurred ;in violation of the
IPKCA.2 6
5. Substantial Interference with Administration of Justice
Amer argued that his behavior did not involve any of the
enumerated examples of actions constituting "substantial
interference with the administration of justice" under sentencing
guidelines section 2J1.2's application notes.287 The Second Circuit
responded that because the application notes state that substantial
interference includes the actions listed, the section does not
prohibit the consideration of additional actions which a court feels
could serve as a basis for sentence enhancement. 288 Furthermore,
the Second Circuit believed that Amer's actions could fall under
the item "premature or improper termination of a felony
investigation," since his act of taking the children outside the
United States prevented any proper legal proceedings from
occurring.289 It might also be noted that other IPKCA cases could
involve another factor listed in section 2J1.2: the "unnecessary
expenditure of substantial government or court resources."'2 90 If an
international parental kidnapper had to be extradited, the United
States would have to use a significant amount of time and
resources to make this happen.29" '
Regardless of which provision is used, upholding the
application of sentence enhancement strengthens the criminal
sentence. The Second Circuit's holding thereby underscores the
objective of using the IPKCA as a deterrent to further international
parental kidnappings.
286 SeeAmer, 110 F.3d at 885.
287 See id.
288 See id.
289 Id.
290 Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.2, Comment (1989)).
291 See Sen. Shelby Announced Funding for National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children & Important Language to Enforce US. Law Abroad Regarding
Child Abduction, Government Press Release, July 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL
12101826 [hereinafter Shelby].
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VII. Additional Problems with the IPKCA as a Tool to
Combat Parental Kidnappings
Although the decision in Amer demonstrated the IPKCA's
potential as an effective means of combating international child
abductions, there are still several unaddressed issues that could
prove to be a problem for parents seeking to use the Act in the
future. For example, one of Congress's objectives in passing the
IPKCA was to provide the force of a federal felony offense in
encouraging foreign governments to assist in the return of the
parent and the children, pursuant to an extradition treaty.
However, Ahmed Amer was not returned to the United States
because he was extradited from Egypt; rather, he came back to the
United States voluntarily, and was not arrested until a month after
he returned, even though a warrant for his arrest had been in
existence for over six months.292
Even if an extradition treaty is an available option, it is not a
guarantee that the foreign state will comply. In a Virginia case,
Walter Benda's children were taken away by his wife, Yoko
Benda, while they were all in Japan. 3 Unable to locate them,
Walter returned to the United States, where his wife, as a
"permanent resident" of the United States according to her visa
permit, was indicted under the IPKCA.24 Assistant U.S. Attorney
Karen Peters said that Yoko Benda would avoid prosecution
unless she was extradited or returned to U.S. soil voluntarily. 5
However, Peters did not expect cooperation from Japan, whose
extradition treaty with the United States is too old to provide for
extradition under this particular offense.9 Members of the
Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C. agreed with Peters that
Japan was unlikely to extradite for this type of offense, because,
292 See Amer, 110 F.3d at 877. In another IPKCA indictment in Pennsylvania, a
father who allegedly removed his children from the United States and brought them to
Egypt was arrested in the Miami International Airport. See Trial Set for International
Kidnapping Case, THE HARRISBURG PATIOT (Pa.), June 25, 1997, at B5.
293 See "Walter, Please Forgive Me for Leaving You This Way, " RoANOKE TIMES &
WORLDNEWS (Va.), June 22, 1996, at Al.
294 See id.
295 See id.
296 See id.
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for one reason, Japan itself has not criminalized such activity. 97
Given the personal nature of the act of parental kidnapping, one
might question how many countries will be willing to extradite
one of their own nationals for such an offense. Furthermore, if
these nations are not signatories to the Hague Convention on Child
Abduction, it is arguable that a federal warrant alone will not make
that much difference in forcing the return of such "criminals."
An additional impediment to the efficacy of the IPKCA is the
time and expense that federal authorities will have to spend on the
return of parent-felons. On July 16, 1997, Senator Gregg, a
member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, testified to
the committee's awareness that "the State Department has been
delinquent in addressing the issues of international parental
kidnapping. ' "29s On July 29, 1997, Senator Richard Shelby, also a
member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, announced that
the full Senate approved a $5.2 million request for the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children and included language
in the bill calling on the State Department to work to enforce U.S.
international child kidnapping laws.'" Mr. Shelby was quoted as
saying:
Many international abduction cases can take years for a parent
to work their way through the diplomatic and legal channels in
order to retrieve their child. Timely action to reunify an
abducted child is critical to the long-term emotional stability of
both the child and the left-behind parent. The United States and
the Department of State must do more to safeguard the best
interests of the children that are the victims of international
abduction.3°°
Perhaps with these new resources, more parents will be
arrested, indicted, and charged for parental kidnappings, and the
legal remedies to such abductions can begin to make headway.
297 See id.
298 S. REP. No. 105-48 at 189 (1997) available in 1997 WL 403181.
299 See Shelby, supra note 291.
300 Id.
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VIII. Conclusion
United States v. Amer is a case of first impression under the
IPKCA. Therefore, it is difficult to predict how effective it will be
in curbing international parental abductions. Because of the
delicate nature of the family interests and the expense and time
involved in effectuating a return of children hidden away in
foreign countries, there are many indications that the Act will not
be able to overcome the practical impediments which also
curtailed the effectiveness of previous legislation. However, Amer
demonstrates that when applied, the IPKCA can work. Ahmed
Amer is serving a criminal sentence for the kidnapping of his
children, and his time in prison will be extended if he does not
return the children to their mother. For the IPKCA to have any
real effect in ending international parental abductions, it will have
to be vigorously enforced.
Despite these problems, if parents can be found and indicted,
or if a significant number of parents return voluntarily to the
United States, Amer indicates that there is real force behind the
IPKCA's provisions. It seems logical that any parent who wanted
custody of a child enough to take the child away to a foreign
country could hardly stomach separation under a prison sentence.
Furthermore, by conditioning releases on the return of the child,
the abducting parent basically has two dissatisfying options: stay
in prison away from the child, or bring the child back in order to
determine which parent has legal custody. Amer shows that the
IPKCA can work. The federal government must now apply the
IPKCA affirmatively and vigorously so that its objectives can
become a reality.
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